Improving Reputational Incentives Mike Rappaport

I haven’t read this paper yet, but it seems quite interesting.  Improving the reputational incentives of drivers and others, like hotel guests, seems like an excellent idea.

This is a paper about using reputation tracking
technologies to displace criminal law enforcement and improve the
tort system. The paper contains an extended application of this
idea to the regulation of motorist behavior in the United States
and examines the broader case for using technologies that
aggregate dispersed information in various settings where
reputational concerns do not adequately deter antisocial behavior.

The paper begins by exploring the existing data on How s My
Driving? programs for commercial fleets. Although more rigorous
study is warranted, the initial data is quite promising,
suggesting that the use of How s My Driving? placards in
commercial trucks is associated with fleet accident reductions
ranging from 20% to 53%. The paper then proposes that all
vehicles on American roadways be fitted with How s My Driving?
placards so as to collect some of the millions of daily
stranger-on-stranger driving observations that presently go to
waste. By delegating traffic regulation to the motorists
themselves, the state might free up substantial law enforcement
resources, police more effectively dangerous and annoying forms
of driver misconduct that are rarely punished, reduce information
asymmetries in the insurance market, improve the tort system, and
alleviate road rage and driver frustration by providing drivers
with opportunities to engage in measured expressions of
displeasure.

The paper addresses obvious objections to the displacement of
criminal traffic enforcement with a system of How s My
Driving? -based civil fines. Namely, it suggests that by using
the sorts of feedback algorithms that eBay and other reputation
tracking systems have employed, the problems associated with
false and malicious feedback can be ameliorated. Indeed, the
false feedback problem presently appears more soluble in the
driving context than it is on eBay. Driver distraction is another
potential pitfall, but available technologies can address this
problem, and the implementation of a How s My Driving? for
Everyone system likely would reduce the substantial driver
distraction that already results from driver frustration and
rubbernecking. The paper also addresses the privacy and due
process implications of the proposed regime. It concludes by
examining various non-driving applications of feedback
technologies to help regulate the conduct of soldiers, police
officers, hotel guests, and participants in virtual worlds, among
others.