Iraq Policy Mike Rappaport

Powerline makes some suggestions for our newn Iraq policy:

To analyze this question, we need to identify the reasons we haveremained in Iraq for the past few years. I can think of five: (1) toavoid a humiliating Mogadishu-style defeat that will embolden ourenemies, (2) to prevent parts of Iraq from becoming a base foranti-American terrorists, as Afghanistan was under the Taliban, (3) toprevent Iran from becoming the dominant player in portions of Iraq, (4)to prevent Iraqis from killing each other in sectarian strife, and (5)to promote a democratic Iraq. To me, the first two objectives are vitalto our national security, and the third probably is very important toit. The fourth and fifth are extremely worthwhile objectives, but arenot of high importance to our national security.

In terms of attainability, the first objective — avoiding defeat –is just a matter of will. The enemy can’t defeat us; defeat occurs onlyif we choose to withdraw. The second objective is also attainable. Wehave proven that we can crush al-Qaeda and other insurgents when theyattempt to seize and hold territory. The third objective — blockingIran — can also be achieved. The pro-Iranian militias cannot takeout-and-out control as long as we’re around.

The fourth goal — preventing Iraqis from killing each other — hasproven to be a bridge too far. There’s little reason to believe that wecan accomplish this with our present level of force. Indeed, it’s notclear that we accomplish it even with higher levels. In any case,higher troop levels, and the death toll that would accompany them, arenot politically sustainable.

As for promoting Iraqi democracy, we’ve done most of what we can do.A democratic system is in place. It’s up to the Iraqis to make it work.

It follows from this analysis that any scaled-down effort in Iraqshould focus on achieving the first three objectives — the ones thatare most vital and most attainable. What would this mean in practice?It would mean that we substantialy reduce our efforts to police Iraqand focus instead on military missions designed to kill anti-Americanterrorists and drive them out of territory they are attempting to hold.

Kagan estimates that the type of scaled down mission I’m describingwould enable us to cut our troop level in half. If I’m right, it wouldalso reduce our casualties even more dramatically. There would, ofcourse, be a price . . .  We would be blamed for it in Iraq, in the MiddleEast generally, and in Europe. Our prestige would suffer. But therewould be no repeat of Mogadishu or Beirut, no Taliban/al Qaeda stylestate or sub-state, and no Iranian takeover. And in time, the Sunnisand the Shia would probably sort things out by separating alongsustainable boundaries.

I think there is a lot to be said for this approach.  A key question: if the United States is able to keep its casualties low — say 1/4 of what they are now — would there still be strong public pressure to withdraw from Iraq?