Report on U.S. Navy Surface-Warfare Capabilities Troubling | National Review
Broadly, the investigators associated with this oversight process asked a large number of former and current Navy personnel whether the ship collisions, the surrender of the small boats, and the burning of the Bonhomme Richard were part of a broader problem within the Navy. An overwhelming 94 percent of respondents said yes. When asked more specifically if the four incidents themselves were directly connected, 55 percent responded affirmatively, but only 16 percent said no. The remaining 29 percent simply were not sure. In the end, the vast preponderance of the respondents simply knew that something was wrong with their Navy and their reasons behind this dangerous change fell along several broad categories. First and foremost, they believed that the Navy has placed an insufficient focus on warfighting even as it has increased administrative burdens throughout the Navy over the past 30 years. Second, the report highlights the trend toward finding efficiencies within the surface community specifically. This in turn contributed to the report s next finding: a decline in investments in training across the surface force in particular, as well as an overall decline in attention to ship maintenance, both in terms of schedule discipline and overall investment. The report also raises the specter of micro-management of individual Navy ships, an issue that is at odds with the Navy s long historical tradition of independence of command, which eroded the confidence of individual ship commanding officers and sapped their individual freedom of action. Lastly, the report cites concerns with the Navy s rising oversensitivity to media reporting of Navy incidents.
We need the Navy so we’d better fix this now.